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ABSTRACT
People naturally bring their prior beliefs to bear on how they
interpret the new information, yet few formal models exist
for accounting for the influence of users’ prior beliefs in
interactions with data presentations like visualizations. We
demonstrate a Bayesian cognitive model for understanding
how people interpret visualizations in light of prior beliefs
and show how this model provides a guide for improving
visualization evaluation. In a first study, we show how ap-
plying a Bayesian cognition model to a simple visualization
scenario indicates that people’s judgments are consistent
with a hypothesis that they are doing approximate Bayesian
inference. In a second study, we evaluate how sensitive our
observations of Bayesian behavior are to different techniques
for eliciting people subjective distributions, and to different
datasets. We find that people don’t behave consistently with
Bayesian predictions for large sample size datasets, and this
difference cannot be explained by elicitation technique. In
a final study, we show how normative Bayesian inference
can be used as an evaluation framework for visualizations,
including of uncertainty.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Data-driven presentations are used by the media, govern-
ment, and private sector to inform and influence public opin-
ion. For example, a journalist might present polling data
prior to a midterm election in a choropleth map to convey
to readers the probability of a Democratic majority in differ-
ent areas. While visualization designers may acknowledge
that users’ expectations and prior knowledge (e.g., about the
political sentiment within their district, or their own prefer-
ences for a given candidate) will influence what they con-
clude from the visualization, visualization design guidance
and evaluation methods rarely acknowledge these factors.
Most conventional visualization design guidance implies that
finding an effective design means choosing the right combi-
nation of visual encodings and comparisons given the target
task. Accordingly, evaluations often frame an ideal user as
one who minimizes perceptual and other cognitive errors in
extracting the information embedded in the visualization.
Opposing a “data-only” view of visualization, models of
graphical comprehension from psychologists have described
how top-down influences, including prior beliefs and exper-
tise, influence what a person attends to [6]. Studies demon-
strate how prior knowledge can lead to other “downstream”
effects on visualization related outcomes, such as how ef-
fective an interactive visualization is for different users [20].
Recent visualization experiments demonstrate how elicit-
ing people’s beliefs about data directly through the inter-
face [29, 30] can positively impact data recall and prompt
critical thinking about data. While this work has examined
how people update their beliefs after providing a prediction
and seeing others’ predictions about data, research in data
visualization has yet to develop descriptive or normative
cognitive models for predicting and evaluating how people
update the prior beliefs they bring upon viewing data.
Outside of visualization research, psychologists have de-
veloped these types of models of how people update their
beliefs or opinions about data or a proposition, given infor-
mation about their prior beliefs [16, 48]. Bayesian models
of cognition compare human cognition, which is assumed
to draw on prior knowledge, to a normative standard for
rational induction from noisy evidence [18]. By combining
key components of Bayesian statistics—including a likeli-
hood function describing the probability of the data given
some assumed distribution, a description of the prior proba-
bility of different values, and laws of conditional probability—
Bayesian cognitive modeling can describe how people update
their beliefs given data. Bayesian models have provided ex-
planatory accounts of how people make various real-world
perceptual judgments, higher cognitive inferences, and learn
and reason inductively [16, 33, 47, 48]. Bayesian cognitive
models can also prescribe what updated beliefs are most con-
sistent with one’s prior beliefs and the data, providing a
normative framework for evaluating interactions with data
presentations.
We make several contributions. First, we demonstrate
a Bayesian cognitive model for assessing how people
interpret data presentations like simple visualizations. In
contrast to other frameworks for studying visualization use,
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a Bayesian cognitive model can be used to examine how
people change their beliefs in response to presented data.
Deploying themodel we develop, we characterize the ex-
tent to which the belief updating of users of a simple
visualization of survey results resembles Bayesian in-
ference (Study 1). We find evidence that on average people
update their beliefs rationally, but individuals often deviate
from expectations of rational belief updating. These findings
hold across multiple datasets and prior elicitation methods
(Study 2). We find that people deviate considerably more
from the predictions of Bayesian inference even in aggregate
when presented with datasets of a very large sample size.
Finally, wedemonstrate howaBayesian cognitivemodel
can be used to evaluate data presentations (Study 3). We
show how Hypothetical Outcome Plots (HOPs), animated
plots that show uncertainty via draws from a distribution, im-
prove deviation from normative Bayesian responses relative
to not presenting error information.
2 BACKGROUND
Interpreting Data Presentations
Cognitive psychologists proposed early models of visualiza-
tion interpretation implying that “top down” factors relating
to a user’s information needs, prior knowledge, and graph
literacy affect how visualized data is interpreted, for example,
by guiding attention [31, 44]. Studies in graph comprehen-
sion provide evidence of such top-down effects [5, 41, 43, 56].
For example, static visualization of processes, which require
use of internal representations to interpret, often outperform
animations [20, 36]. Other studies show that externalizing
one’s internal representations leads to better understanding
of visualized information [7, 8, 21, 39, 45].
The Impact of Prior Knowledge & Beliefs. In reflecting on the
“value” of visualization, Van Wijk notes that the knowledge
gained from a visualization will depend on the prior knowl-
edge that a user brings [51]. Recent research demonstrates
that while visualizations are slightly more likely to persuade
people to change their attitudes about a data driven topic
(e.g., to be more likely to believe that some factor X causes
some symptom Y), the polarity of the person’s original atti-
tude influences the strength of the visualization’s effect [42].
Going a step further toward understanding the role of prior
beliefs, Kim et al. show that asking visualization users to
“draw” their predictions in an interactive visualization prior
to seeing the observed data can help them remember data 30%
better [29, 30], perhaps by increasing their ability to compare
the observed data to their expectations. Deviation between a
predicted trend or value and the observed trend or value has
been shown to be predictive of people’s updated beliefs and
ability to recall data [30, 38]. However, these works focused
on eliciting a user’s single best prediction of a trend, rather
than a distribution over possible values, which is required
for making use of the normative predictors that are possible
from a Bayesian approach.
Bayesian Cognition
In cognitive science, Bayesian statistics has proven to be
a powerful tool for modeling human cognition [16, 48]. In
a Bayesian framework, individual cognition is modeled as
Bayesian inference: an individual is said to have implicit be-
liefs about the world ("priors"); when the individual observes
new data, their prior is "updated" to produce a new set of
beliefs which account for the observed data (this new set
of beliefs is referred to as the "posterior"). The prior is for-
malized as a probability distribution and Bayes’ rule is used
to obtain the posterior from the prior distribution and the
likelihood function that the observed data is derived from.
This approach has been used to model many aspects of
human cognition at various levels of complexity, such as
object perception [28], causal reasoning [46], and knowledge
generalization [47].
Particularly relevant to our work is a study conducted
by Griffiths and Tenenbaum [18], which compared people’s
predictions for a number of everyday quantities to the pre-
dictions made by a model that used the empirical distribution
as a prior (e.g., for human lifespans they used a model with
a prior calculated from historical human lifespan data). The
study found that although there was variance between indi-
viduals, in aggregate people’s judgments closely resembled
the normative Bayesian posterior. We are similarly interested
in how judgments that people make in everyday interactions
with data presentations (like visualizations) compare to the
expectations of normative Bayesian inference.
Approximate Inference & Sampling Behavior. While Bayesian
models of cognition have seen wide applications, the idea
that human cognition is accurately described as Bayesian
inference is inconsistent with previous influential findings
in cognitive psychology from authors such as Tversky and
Kahneman [50]. Tversky and Kahneman found evidence that
humans often use simple heuristics in their decisions, and
that these heuristics lead to sub-optimal judgments. More re-
cent research indicates that heuristics are adaptive and often
lead to accurate judgments (e.g., [13]). A recently proposed
explanation which reconciles the seemingly opposing find-
ings between Bayesian models of cognition and the idea that
heuristics lead to non-optimal judgments is motivated by
Bayesian cognition [17]: what if human cognition is not ex-
act Bayesian inference, but instead is approximate Bayesian
inference? One such approach proposes that while people
have a prior probability distribution which encodes their
beliefs, they do not form judgments using the entire distri-
bution at once [52]. Instead, they take a small number of
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Figure 1: Bayesian inference at individual & aggregate level.
samples from the distribution, and reason with these sam-
ples instead of the full distribution (we which refer to as
sample-based Bayesian). Being a sample-based Bayesian can
lead to sub-optimal individual inferences, but in aggregate, it
can produce results very similar to exact Bayesian inference.
Application to Data Visualization. Recent work by Wu et
al. [55] explored the application of the Bayesian framework
to examine how people update their beliefs when viewing
visualized data. However, Wu et al. prompted participants to
internalize a provided prior, show them the observed data,
and then ask for their posterior beliefs. Using a fixed prior
is not ideal in cases where participants’ pre-existing beliefs
about a phenomenon will impact their ultimate beliefs. Our
work demonstrates how to elicit and model participants’ per-
sonalized priors for a more realistic application of Bayesian
inference, including proposing and evaluating multiple elici-
tation techniques.
3 DEVELOPING RESEARCH QUESTIONS & GOALS
Prior beliefs clearly play a role in data interpretation. How-
ever, belief updating is rarely formally modeled in research
related to data presentation and visualization. Studies of
Bayesian cognition suggest that Bayesian inference can be
used to characterize many aspects of learning and cognition.
We apply a Bayesian cognitive modeling approach to a sim-
ple data interpretation task to understand where people align
with, and deviate from, normative Bayesian inference individ-
ually and in aggregate. While the computational complexity
of Bayesian inference makes it doubtful that cognition uses
exact inference [25], in the context of interpreting presented
data in everyday settings (such as in data journalism) we
would expect under Bayesian assumptions to see that people
(1) are capable of providing priors describing the uncertainty
in their beliefs about a parameter, and (2) update these beliefs
to incorporate observed data. Our work sheds light on the
degree to which these assumptions hold for a simple data
interpretation task.
In contrast to prior work in Bayeisan cognition that avoids
obtaining priors directly from people [18, 55], we design and
apply a paradigm in which we elicit people’s prior and poste-
rior beliefs about the probability that a parameter takes various
values (Studies 1, 2, 3). Though it is commonly argued that
people have difficulties reasoning about probability, the no-
tion that people are capable of maintaining subjective proba-
bilities is well-established in decision theory, congruent with
canonical work in judgment and decision making like that
of Tversky and Kahneman [50], and supported by a body
of work in economics on subjective probability elicitation,
including from laypeople (see [34] for a review. Having ob-
tained prior beliefs, we fit a distribution to them then use
Bayes’ rule to compute the normative posterior distribution
for each person, the posterior distribution that is expected
if the person is a perfect Bayesian agent given the observed
data and their prior distribution.
In a first study, we compare the distribution fit to the
posterior beliefs we elicited from each person to the nor-
mative posterior beliefs computed using that person’s prior
Bayesian solutions (Fig. 1 top row). We also compare people’s
aggregate posterior distribution (i.e. the posterior distributions
representing the aggregate of all people’s posterior distribu-
tions) to the normative aggregate posterior distribution (i.e.,
the normative posterior distribution calculated using a prior
distribution representing the aggregate of all people’s prior
distributions) (Fig. 1 bottom row). Alignment between peo-
ple’s responses and the normative Bayesian solution at this
aggregate level may suggest that people are “sample-based
Bayesians” [52] performing approximately inference.
Prior work in visualization and judgment and decision
making suggests that different subjective probability elici-
tation techniques can produce varying results, perhaps be-
cause some techniques (such as frequency framings) bet-
ter align with people’s internal representations of uncer-
tainty [15, 22, 40]. In a second study, we assess how sensitive
people’s responses are to different elicitation methods, which
vary in the input format for beliefs they use (i.e., continuous
probability versus discrete samples).
In a third study, we show how a Bayesian cognitive model
can be used to assess the effectiveness of design changes. One
aspect of visualization design that is likely to be relevant to
how people update beliefs is the presentation of uncertainty.
If people see the observed data as more certain than it is (e.g.,
reflecting belief in the law of small numbers [49]), their pos-
terior judgments may reflect overweighting of the observed
data and underweighting of their prior. On the other hand,
if people see the data as less certain that it is (e.g., non-belief
in the law of large numbers [3]), their posterior judgments
may reflect underweighting of the observed data and over-
weighting of their prior. To demonstrate how a Bayesian
cognitive model can support visualization design decisions,
we compare the results of Bayesian modeling across a default
static visualization typical of those found in the media and an
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animated hypothetical outcome plot (HOP [23]) uncertainty
visualization.
4 S1: BAYESIAN DATA INTERPRETATION
We demonstrate how a Bayesian model cognition of cogni-
tion can be used as a framework for assessing visualization
interpretation. We evaluate the extent to which individuals’
judgments are consistent with people being “fully” Bayesian
by assessing how closely their individual posterior distribu-
tions align with the normative posterior distribution calcu-
lated given their prior. Secondly, we also consider whether
people’s judgments might instead be consistent with people
being “sample-based” Bayesians (one form of being approxi-
mately Bayesian) by evaluating how closely the aggregate
posterior distribution aligns with the normative aggregate
posterior distribution.
Study Design
We designed a between-subjects experiment with 50 partici-
pants. We determined sample size via a prospective power
analysis conducted on pilot data with a desired power of at
least 0.8 (α=0.05) to detect a difference between the norma-
tive distribution and aggregated posterior distribution. We
recruited participants from AmazonMechanical Turk (AMT),
rewarding their participation with $1.0. The average time to
complete the task was 7.3 minutes (SD=5.2).
Dataset & Presentation. For the purposes of understanding
how Bayesian cognitive modeling might provide insight into
visualization interpretation, we sought a realistic yet rela-
tively simple dataset similar those shown in the media or
public facing reports. We selected a dataset with a single vari-
able which represents a proportion. The dataset describes
survey results intended to measure attitudes towards men-
tal health in the tech workplace (N=747) [1]. We chose one
question from the survey “how often do you feel that mental
health affects your work?” to formulate our proportion pa-
rameter: “the proportion of women in the tech industry who
feel that mental health affects their work often.” To present
the observed proportion to participants in our study, we cre-
ated an “info-graphic” style visualization (Fig. 5 (a)) which
shows this proportion using a grid format commonly used
in the media to present proportions (e.g., [2, 24, 35]).
Prior & Posterior Elicitation. To elicit participants’ prior and
posterior distributions, we used a technique that asks partici-
pants about two properties of their internal distribution: the
most probable value of the parameter (mode (m)) and their
subjective probability (Fig. 4(b)) that the parameter falls into
the interval around the mode ([m− 0.25m,m+ 0.25m]). Prior
research in probability elicitation for proportions indicates
that this technique is less sensitive to noise which arises
from externalizing subjective uncertainty compared to other
techniques [54]. A second benefit of this approach is that
estimates of Beta distribution parameters can be analytically
computed from participants’ answers [10].
Results
Fitting Individual Responses. We first converted participants’
elicited responses of prior and posterior beliefs to Beta dis-
tributions using an optimization approach suggested in pre-
vious work [40]. The approach finds an optimal Beta distri-
bution parameterized by α and β which minimizes the sum
of two terms: (1) the square difference between the partici-
pants’ mode and the estimated mode of the Beta distribution
and (2) the square difference between the probability that
each participant associated with the interval and the esti-
mated probability of the interval in the distribution being
optimized.
Fitting Aggregate Responses. To obtain parameters for the
aggregated prior/posterior distributions (αagg and βagg), we
averaged participants’ αs and βs respectively from the in-
dividual prior/posterior distributions: αagg = (α1 + ... +
αN)/N , βagg = (β1 + ... + βN)/N (where N = # of partici-
pants).
Calculating Normative Posteriors. We can calculate a partici-
pant’s normative posterior by using α and β estimates from
their prior distribution combined with the number of suc-
cesses (e.g., the number of women who said their mental
health affects their work often) and failures (e.g., the number
of women who said their mental health affects their work
not often) in the observed data (Eq. 1). The α and β for the
aggregated normative posterior are calculated in the same
manner using the aggregated prior α and β estimates.
αnormative posterior = #successes + αprior
βnormative posterior = #f ailures + βprior
(1)
Figure 2: Distributions of residuals (observed - predicted) for
participants’ posteriors’ means and standard deviations and
the means and standard deviations of the normative poste-
riors.
We evaluate the degree to which individual and aggregate
posterior distributions resemble the normative Bayesian pos-
terior distributions by plotting residuals (observed - predicted)
when predicting the means and standard deviations of par-
ticipants’ posterior distributions using normative Bayesian
inference (Fig. 2). A distribution of residuals that is loosely
centered around zero suggests “noisy” Bayesian inference,
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where each individual may deviate from the normative pos-
terior due to approximate inference but in aggregate, the
observed posterior resembles the normative posterior. Resid-
uals for means are roughly centered around zero, with 95%
of the values falling between -0.16 and 0.58). A small number
of participants provided means that were much greater than
predicted (i.e., believed that the true proportion of women in
tech who feel that mental health affects their work often was
much larger than predicted from the prior and the observed
data). Residuals for standard deviation are also roughly dis-
tributed around zero, but show a stronger bias toward larger
standard deviation in one’s posterior judgments. This sug-
gests a tendency among participants to provide posterior
beliefs indicating more uncertainty than is rational given the
observed data according to Bayesian inference.
Following this observation, we analyzed where each par-
ticipant’s posterior distribution was located relative to the
normative posterior distribution (Fig. 3). We found that 44%
of participants (22 out of 50) overweighted the mode of the
observed data (i.e., their posterior distributions are closer to
the observed data than they should be), while 34% of partic-
ipants (17 out of 50) overweighted the mode of their prior
distribution, and 18% of the participants (9 out of 50) pro-
vided posterior beliefs that moved further than the prior
from the observed data. Only two participants (4%) were
within ±1% range of the mode of their normative posteriors.
Figure 3: Proportions of participants whose posterior distri-
butions (dotted line) imply overweighting of the mode of
the observed data, reasonable alignment with the normative
posterior, and overweighting of the mode of the prior distri-
butions. An additional 18% of participants (not shown) pro-
vided posterior beliefs that were further than the prior from
the observed data.
Per our pre-registration we also report log KL divergence
(KLD) [32] between normative and observed posteriors. KLD
is an information theoretic measure of the difference between
two probability distributions. Examining log KLD at the in-
dividual and aggregate levels aligned with our observation
from the residual plots: few individuals act “fully Bayesian”,
but in aggregate the responses are close to normative predic-
tions. The mean log KLD for a participant at the individual
level was 0.52 (SD=1.18; 3.31 in non-log terms). Normative
behavior is represented by a smaller log KLD and non-log
KLD close to 0. The aggregate log KLD was -2.18 (non-log
KLD=0.11), which aligns with previous work that demon-
strates people’s collective reasoning is more consistent with
Bayesian optimal behaviors even when individuals do not
necessarily act as a fully Bayesian agent [18].
5 S2: ELICITATION TECHNIQUES & DATASET
Study 1 (S1) used an elicitation technique from the literature
which was designed for fitting Beta distributions to partici-
pants’ responses using a numerical solution [10]. While the
technique has been shown to be less sensitive to noise from
the elicitation process than other techniques [54], it is pos-
sible that the evidence for approximate or “sample-based”
Bayesian inference that we observed was an artifact of the
elicitation technique. For instance, by asking for a mode
value, it is possible that the technique prompted people to
consider only a single sample. We are interested in evalu-
ating how robust our result in Study 1 is to changes in the
dataset that is presented. In a second pre-registered study,1
we therefore evaluate four different elicitation techniques
(including interval elicitation from Study 1) and introduce a
new dataset. The elicitation techniques vary in the degree
to which they ask a participant to provide a full distribution
versus a small set of samples. By manipulating both repre-
sentation of uncertainty and the dataset, we aim to gain a
better sense of how robust our observation of approximate
Bayesian inference is.
Developing Elicitation Techniques & Conditions
We are interested in comparing a set of interfaces which vary
in the format they use to elicit participants’ responses. We
describe two sample-based techniques of our own design, as
well as two elicitation techniques from the literature. While
our data interpretation task requires eliciting a Beta distribu-
tion specifically, we expect that the techniques we evaluate
should generalize to other symmetric distributions.
Sample-based Elicitation. Evidence from research on reason-
ing with uncertainty (e.g., on classical Bayesian reasoning
tasks [12]) and uncertainty visualization [9, 22, 23, 26, 27]
indicates that people are often better at thinking about uncer-
tainty when it is framed as frequency rather than probability.
One way to elicit uncertainty is through a technique that
asks people to provide one sample at a time until they have
exhausted their mental representation. Imagine a person
who is asked to provide their expectations for the propor-
tion of women in tech who experience mental issues often.
Several possible proportions seem salient to them, including
20% and 33%. We devise a sample-based elicitation method
that asks a person to articulate a small set of samples (e.g.,
5), one at a time (Fig. 4(a)).
1http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=4bf9ci
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Figure 4: Elicitation target and interface associatedwith each elicitation technique.Wedeveloped two sample-based techniques
(a), and used an interval technique [54] (b) and a graphical “balls and bins” technique [15] (c) from the literature.
Even if people find it easy to reason in the form of sam-
ples, wemight still expect that they perceive some samples as
more likely. A sample-based elicitation technique would not
prevent a person from providing the same sample multiple
times, proportional to its expected probability (i.e., resam-
pling with replacement). However, articulating the same
sample multiple times can be tedious. For each sample a
person provides, our technique asks for a corresponding
judgment about the salience of the sample in the form of
subjective confidence. Using this technique, the hypothetical
person with two samples of 20% and 33% might provide 20%
as a first estimate with a higher confidence (e.g., 70 on a
scale of 0 to 100), and 33% as a second estimate with a lower
confidence (e.g., 30). In practice, the confidence values do
not need to sum to 100 as they can be normalized prior to
using them to fit the responses to a distribution.
We created two versions of our sample-based elicitation
technique. A graphical sample-based elicitation inter-
face (Fig. 4 (a) left) allows participants to provide a pre-
dicted value (i.e., sample) by clicking icons in an icon array.
This interface is nearly identical to the visual format used
to present the observed data, except for the elicitation icon
arrays, which use circles. An analogous text sample-based
elicitation interface (Fig. 4 (a) right) allows participants to
provide a predicted value by entering number in a text box.
As a participant provides their samples, each prior sample
is appended to the bottom of the interface so that participants
can review their samples and corresponding confidence val-
ues before submitting the response.
Graphical Distribution Elicitation. To conduct a Bayesian
analysis in many domains (e.g., clinical trials, meteorology,
etc.), analysts probe domain experts for uncertainty esti-
mates, then use these to construct a prior distribution [40].
This approach generally assumes that people with domain
knowledge possess a relatively complete mental representa-
tion of the uncertainty in a parameter. Graphical elicitation
of a full subjective distribution has been proposed for use
among lay people, such as to elicit preferred retirement out-
comes [14]. Recent research indicates that a graphical inter-
face that enables constructing a distribution via placing 100
hypothetical outcomes (“balls”, or circles representing hypo-
thetical outcomes) in multiple ranges (“bins”) allows people
to articulate a distribution that they have been presented
with more accurately than a method that asks for quantiles
of the distribution [15]. We implemented a graphical “balls
and bins” elicitation interface (Fig. 4(c)). Participants are
prompted to add exactly 100 balls in bins that span between
0% to 100% in increments of 5% to express the distribution
they have in mind. Relative to the text and graphical sample-
based techniques we developed, the graphical balls and bins
interface encourages a person to consider their entire sub-
jective probability distribution at once.
Sample + Partial Distribution Elicitation. The interval tech-
nique we used in Study 1 may be best considered a hybrid ap-
proach between approaches that emphasize small sets of sam-
ples and those that emphasize a full distribution (Fig. 4(b)).
The mode that a participant provides can be thought of as the
most salient sample in their priors. The subjective probabil-
ity that a participant provides is analogous to the probability
mass of a partial distribution.
As in Study 1, participants are first prompted to provide a
prediction (m). Participants are then asked to provide the sub-
jective probability (sp) that the true proportion falls into the
range calculated based on the mode value that they entered
([m −m ∗ 0.25,m +m ∗ 0.25]).2
2We elicited two additional random ranges to see how the response is
impacted by the ranges. The analysis is in the supplemental material.
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Figure 5: The data presentations for S1 (a) and S2 (a, b).
Study Design
Dataset and Presentation: We reuse the same proportion
dataset used in Study 1 (mental health outcomes among
women in the tech industry) and the same icon array visu-
alization. However, we are also interested in understanding
how robust our findings are to changes in the nature of the
observed data. Specifically, the sample size of the observed
data directly influences how closely the normative posterior
is expected to align with the data. Intuitively, as the sample
size of the observed data increases, the impact of the prior
distribution on the normative posterior is reduced. With
a very large sample, the normative posterior will be virtu-
ally indistinguishable from the data even with a reasonably
concentrated prior distribution (Fig. 6).
Figure 6: Illustration of the effect of sample size on norma-
tive posteriors given the same prior and observed mode.
We therefore chose one additional large sample dataset
that has been visualized in the New York Times using icon-
style visualizations [4]. This dataset depicts the results of
a study of chronic health conditions among assisted living
center residents in the U.S. (N=750,000). We chose one type
of chronic health condition (Alzheimer’s disease or another
form of dementia) to formulate our target proportion. We
asked participants to reason about “the proportion of res-
idents who have Alzheimer’s disease or another form of
dementia” in the task. We created a visualization (Fig. 5 (b))
that shows this proportion in a similar icon array format to
that used for the mental health in tech dataset. Because of
the size of the sample, we tell participants that each icon
represents 600 residents of assisted living centers.
Procedure. We used the same procedure as in Study 1 (elic-
iting priors, presenting observed data, eliciting posteriors).
However, in Study 2 we randomly assigned participants to
Figure 7: Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals for average
log KLDs.
one of the four elicitation conditions, and one of the two
datasets. On the last page of the experiment, we asked a
pre-registered attention-check question about the numeric
range in which the observed proportion fell to exclude par-
ticipants who may not have paid attention to the observed
data. Participants were asked to choose an answer among
three ranges (0%-30%, 30%-60%, 60%-100%).
Participants. Based on a prospective power analysis con-
ducted on pilot data with a desired power of at least 0.8
assuming α=0.05, we recruited 800 workers with an approval
rating of 98% or more (400 per dataset, 200 per elicitation
condition) in the U.S from Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT).
We disallowed workers who took part in Study 1. We ex-
cluded participants who did not respond correctly to our
attention check question from the result according to our
pre-registration. We posted the task to AMT until 800 partic-
ipants who correctly answered the attention check question
were recruited. Participants received $1.0 as a reward. The
average time to complete the task was 4.8 minutes (SD=3.35).
Results
Data Preliminaries. For each technique, we aimed to use
the simple and most direct technique to fit a Beta distri-
bution, so as to minimize noise contributed by the fitting
process. For sample-based elicitation conditions, we used
the Method of Moments [19] to estimate distribution pa-
rameters (i.e., alpha and beta) using samples provided by
each participant. This method provides an estimate using
the mean of the samples that participants provided (x¯) and
the variance of the samples (v¯) to calculate beta parameters:
α = x¯( x¯ (1−x¯ )v¯ − 1), β = (1 − x¯)( x¯ (1−x¯ )v¯ − 1). Since we asked
participants to provide their subjective confidence with each
sample, we calculated weighted x¯ by multiplying the value
of each sample by the corresponding confidence value. This
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approach does not provide a unique solution when the partic-
ipant provides the same values five times or 0 confidence for
all samples. In this case, we gave the participant an uninfor-
mative uniform prior (α = 1, β = 1). We provide a sensitivity
analysis to different ways of interpreting these “deviant”cases
in the supplemental material 3. For the graphical distribution
condition, we also used the Method of Moments approach
by considering each ball as a sample known within a 5% (the
bin width). For the sample & partial distribution condition,
we used the same optimization approach we used in Study 1.
Residual Analysis and Log KLD. To assess the effect of elicita-
tion technique on individual-level alignment with the nor-
mative Bayesian solution, we again plot residuals between
normative (predicted) means and standard deviations for
each participant and observed means and standard devia-
tions (Fig. 8). For the tech dataset (N=158) used in Study 2, we
observed a similar pattern as in Study 1, with errors roughly
equally distributed about zero for means, and around zero
but with a slight bias toward the degree of variance of priors
(i.e., overestimating variance in the data).
For the elderly dataset (N=750,000), residuals for means
are again roughly symmetric about zero, but residuals for
standard deviations are nearly entirely to the right of zero.
This suggests a strong tendency for people to be more uncer-
tainty about the true proportion than they should rationally
be, given the size of the observed dataset.
We see some small differences in residual distributions
between techniques. For example, those using the graphical
balls and bins interface (Fig. 8 fourth column) appear to be
slightly more consistent (i.e., more concentrated distribution)
and slightly less likely to be biased in their estimates of
standard deviation of the elderly dataset (Fig. 8 bottom row).
We counted the participants whose responses spanned more
than three bins, with the number of balls on either side
of the center bin differing by less than two balls. 110 out
of 200 participants in this condition attempted to create a
symmetric distribution across more than three bins (totaling
a 15% range) for their posterior distribution. Prior work on
graphical elicitation has proposed that the axes ranges of an
elicitation interface may implicitly influence the predictions
that people “draw”. In the case of the graphical distribution
interface, it is possible that participants relied on a heuristic
suggesting that distributions should be roughly centered and
span more than one bin. The small differences in techniques,
however, are far less pronounced that the more obvious
differences between people’s residuals for standard deviation
for the (large) elderly dataset versus the (small) tech dataset.
Per our pre-registration we constructed bootstrapped 95%
confidence intervals for the mean individual log KLD be-
tween participants’ posteriors and the normative posteriors.
3https://github.com/yeaseulkim/Bayesian-Visualization
Figure 8: Distributions of residuals (observed-predicted) for
participants’ posteriors’ means and standard deviations and
the means and standard deviations of normative posteriors.
Full results from this analysis are in supplemental material.
We found that on average, the mean log KLDs from all con-
ditions were larger than we would expect if people are “fully
Bayesian” at an individual level, further aligning with what
we see in Fig. 8. Across both datasets, we saw no consistent
effects of the elicitation techniques on alignment between
people’s posteriors and the normative posteriors as measured
by log KLD.
To disambiguate whether the difference between the tech
dataset and the elderly dataset is due to the different domains
of the data or the different sample sizes, we introduced ad-
ditional datasets by manipulating sample size. We reran the
study with the sample sizes switched for the two datasets
(tech dataset N=720,000, elderly dataset N=150). We observed
the same pattern of results in residual plots (presented in
supplemental material), where elicitation techniques did not
appear to reliably impact individual’s residuals in means or
standard deviations, but the larger sample size datasets led
to residual standard deviations that were strongly biased
toward greatly overestimating the amount of uncertainty
one should feel given their prior and the observed data. We
again confirmed these results by examining log KLD (see
supplemental material). We speculate that the deviation is
caused by a well-documented tendency among people to
show insensitivity to sample size and its relationship to vari-
ance (sampling error) [50]. Hence participants did not weight
the value of information captured by the observed elderly
dataset as much as they should, given its large sample size
(N=750,000).
We examined the aggregate level log KLD results to con-
firmwhat the residual plots suggested regarding approximate
Bayesian inference for the smaller sample datasets but not
for the larger sample datasets. We found that while people’s
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responses were consistent with an approximate or sample-
based Bayesian hypothesis for the small sample size datasets,
we don’t see analogous evidence that people act as sample-
based Bayesians for the large sample datasets (Fig. 9(a, b)).
Figure 9: Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals for aggre-
gate KLDs.
Perceived Sample Size. To contextualize these results further,
we analyzed perceived sample size. One benefit of obtaining
distributions rather than just expected values (e.g., [29, 30])
is that we can interpret the parameters of the fitted Beta
distributions to gain insight into how participants perceived
the data. For a Beta distribution, the two parameters α and β
are associated with the sample size that the distribution rep-
resents. α stands for the number of successful trials, and
β stands for the number of failed trials. By treating the
participants’ posteriors as normative posteriors and using
the elicited priors, we reverse-calculated the perceived ob-
served data distribution (αperceived data and βperceived data) for
each participant (in other words, the counts that a Bayesian
would have perceived in the data to arrive at that posterior),
then summed these two parameters for sample size. Fig-
ure 10 shows how the perceived sample size of the observed
data was roughly the same across elicitation techniques and
datasets. The mean across all techniques for the tech dataset
(N=158) was 212.47 (median=41.14) whereas the mean of el-
derly dataset (N=750,000) was 359.58 (median=51.51), despite
the enormous actual difference in the sample sizes of the
observed data (158 vs. 750,000).
6 S3: UNCERTAINTY VIS & PRIOR ELICITATION
In Study 2 (S2), we observed a pervasive insensitivity to
the sample size of the observed data. We turn now to how a
Bayesian approach can be used to evaluate howwell different
visualization alternatives encourage normative interpreta-
tions. One natural way to attempt to better calibrate people to
Figure 10: Perceived sample size as implied by partici-
pants’ prior and posterior distributions. Participants per-
ceived similar sample sizes between two very different sized
datasets.
the potential for sampling error as a function of sample size
is to explicitly present uncertainty information. Visualizing
uncertainty may help people make better-calibrated judg-
ments on how much they should weigh the observed data
when they incorporate it with their prior beliefs to formulate
their posterior beliefs. We also consider the possibility that
the insensitivity to large sample sizes that we observe is ex-
aggerated by people anchoring to their prior beliefs because
they have been made more salient by elicitation. Our goals
in our third pre-registered4 study are to use Bayesian cogni-
tion to evaluate the effect of uncertainty visualization and
to better understand the extent to which the act of eliciting
people’s priors might alter how they update their beliefs.
Elicitation Technique & Dataset
To evaluate our questions, we used the tech dataset (N=158)
and the elderly dataset (N=750,000) that we used in Study 2
(Fig. 5). We used the text sample-based technique from Study
2. To show uncertainty around the observed data, we used
Hypothetical Outcome Plots (HOPs) [23]. HOPs convey un-
certainty by animating set outcomes randomly drawn from
a target distribution. To create HOPs for each dataset, we
constructed a binomial distribution using parameters of the
dataset (e.g., β(n = 158,p = 0.17) for the tech dataset), then
sampled multiple hypothetical modes from the distribution
to present as hypothetical outcomes, using a frame rate of
400ms as suggested by prior work [23, 26] (Fig. 11).
Figure 11: The example frames from theHOPs (tech dataset).
Conditions & Participants
We crossed two interventions (uncertainty visualization,
prior elicitation) to arrive at four study conditions (Fig. 12).
Participants in theElicitation-Uncertainty conditionwere
prompted to externalize their priors before seeing the ob-
served data, then to examine the observed data as HOPs.
4http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=496ri9
PREPRINT, PREPRINT, PREPRINT Kim et al.
Participants in the Elicitation-No uncertainty condition
were prompted to externalize their priors before seeing the
observed data, then to examine the observed data as a static
icon array as in Study 2. Participants in the No elicitation-
Uncertainty conditionwere asked to examine the observed
data presented with HOPs but were not prompted to ex-
ternalize their prior beliefs. Lastly, participants in the No
elicitation-No uncertainty condition were asked to ex-
amine the static observed data without being prompted to
externalize their prior beliefs beforehand. Participants in all
conditions provided their posterior beliefs after examining
the observed data.
Figure 12: Table of Study 3 conditions.
The Elicitation-No uncertainty condition responses con-
sisted of participants’ responses from the text sample-based
conditions from Study 2 (responses from a total of 200 par-
ticipants, 100 per dataset). For the remaining conditions, we
recruited an additional 600 participants (100 per condition, a
total of 300 per dataset) in the U.S from AMT. We disallowed
workers who took part in Study 1 or Study 2. We excluded
participants who did not respond correctly to our attention
check question. We posted the task to AMT until 300 partici-
pants who correctly answered the attention check questions
were recruited. Participants received $1.0 as a reward.
Analysis Approach
Per our pre-registration we used a Bayesian linear regression
implemented in R’s rethinking package to evaluate the effect
of prior elicitation and uncertainty visualization using a
single measure (log KLD). We examined residual plots for
mean and variance of participants’ posterior distributions
for all conditions (see supplemental material) to confirm our
model interpretations below.
To compute the normative posterior for No-elicitation
conditions, we used the aggregate priors from participants
in the text sample-based condition in Study 2 (Tech dataset:
α = 10.79, β = 18.99, Elderly dataset:α = 31.25, β = 39.59).
We specified a model to regress the mean effect in individ-
ual log KLD on dummy variables indicating whether uncer-
tainty visualization was shown, whether prior elicitation
was prompted and which dataset was presented (tech vs.
elderly). We specified identical weakly regularizing Gaussian
priors for mean effects (µ: 0, σ : 1) and half-Cauchy priors
(Cauchy distributions defined over positive real numbers) for
scale parameters (µ: 0, σ : 1). The thick tailed Cauchy distribu-
tion tends to be slightly preferable to Gaussian distributions
as a weakly regularizing prior for standard deviations [37].
We included the (mean-centered) time that the participant
spent to examine the observed data to interpret whether time
spent alone impacted the results. We present posterior mean
estimates of effects with 95% confidence intervals.
Results
Mean task completion time was 3.8 minutes (SD:2.4) for No-
elicitation and 4.7 (SD:3.2) for Elicitation conditions.
Impacts on Individuals’ Updated Beliefs. Figure 13 shows the
posterior mean estimates for effects on log KLD. Prior elici-
tation reduced log KLD of individuals’ posterior beliefs rela-
tive to the normative Bayesian posteriors but not reliably so
(mean:-0.04, 95% CI:[-0.15,0.1]). Log KLD reliably improved
when participants were exposed to uncertainty visualization,
with log KLDs relative to the normative posteriors for those
who viewed HOPs being on average lower by -0.15 (95%
CI:[-0.29,-0.04]). Being assigned to view the large sample
size dataset (i.e., elderly dataset) still had a large impact on
results at the individual level, with the average log KLD for
those who viewed the large sample dataset being on average
1.54 log KLD units larger than those for the small sample
size dataset (95% CI:[1.42,1.67]). Spending more time exam-
ining the observed data reduced log KLD but not reliably
(mean=-0.07, 95% CI:[-0.14,0.01]).
Figure 13: Posterior mean estimates of effects with 95% con-
fidence intervals from a model regressing the mean effect
on individual log KLD on whether uncertainty visualiza-
tionwas shown,whether prior elicitationwas prompted and
which dataset was presented. Lower values indicate a greater
effect toward lowering log KLD.
Perceived Sample Size. Even though participants assigned to
examine the large sample size dataset had relatively high
log KLDs relative to the small sample size dataset, viewing
HOPs did have some impact on how accurately they per-
ceived the sample size of the observed data. Figure 14 shows
how the predicted perceived sample size of the observed data
based on the dataset and whether uncertainty (HOPs) was
presented. For the tech dataset (N=158), while the means of
the No uncertainty and Uncertainty conditions were similar
(326.0 vs. 327.3), the median was much closer to the actual
sample size of the dataset for the Uncertainty conditions
(median perceived: 166.3, true sample size: 158) than the No
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uncertainty conditions (median perceived: 97.2). For the el-
derly dataset (N=750,000), both the mean and median of the
Uncertainty conditions were closer to the true observed sam-
ple size (mean perceived: 60,268.9, median perceived: 734.0,
true sample size: 750,000) than the No uncertainty conditions
(mean perceived: 809.54, median perceived: 216.1). These re-
sults suggest that presenting uncertainty information helps
people arrive at normative Bayesian inferences. However,
our results also suggest that uncertainty presentation may
help some participants more than others.
Figure 14: Perceived sample size for the tech and the elderly
datasets. The uncertainty visualization helps participants
more accurately perceived sample size in the both datasets.
7 DISCUSSION
Data Interpretation as Bayesian Cognition
Through three studies, we demonstrated how a Bayesian
cognitive modeling approach can be used to interpret and
evaluate how people update their beliefs after being exposed
to a data presentation. Our work represents an important
step forward for visualization research for several reasons.
First, our work provides evidence to suggest that in a
naturalistic scenario wherein people bring prior beliefs, visu-
alization cognition can be interpreted as a Bayesian process.
While no single study can definitively establish whether
people reason about presented data in a Bayesian way, our
experiments showed that on average, people’s responses
were consistent with a sample-based Bayesian account when
examining small sample size datasets. On average, people’s
responses deviated from Bayesian reasoning when presented
with large sample size datasets. Future work might test a
larger range of sample sizes to further characterize this bias.
We found that the act of eliciting prior beliefs reduces devia-
tion from the normative Bayesian posterior but not reliably
so, and that aggregated prior distributions can be used in
place of individual level priors to predict a person’s deviation
from the normative posterior.
While we used Bayesian cognition as an inferential model
to examine how rationally people updated their beliefs at an
individual and aggregate level, a Bayesian cognitive model
like ours would support studying other influences in visual-
ization or data interpretation. A Bayesian cognitive model
could enable designers and researchers to derive more in-
depth insights about how graphical, contextual, and indi-
vidual factors drive the difference between observed versus
expected belief change. For example, preferences for certain
states of the world are related to, but distinct from, subjec-
tive probabilities. Preferences over parameter values (e.g.,
what should the percentage of women responding positive
to the survey question be?) could be elicited as a means of
explaining deviation, as could other subjective beliefs like
one’s trust in the data source.
Our second contributionwas to demonstrate howBayesian
cognitive modeling can be used prescriptively to evaluate
how well visualization alternatives promote rational behav-
ior. We used the alignment between participants’ posteriors
and the normative Bayesian posterior to reason about how
“helpful” it is to add uncertainty representation to a visual-
ization intended for a lay audience.
An important implication of our findings stems from the
evidence we find that visualization users do not necessarily
perceive the data they are presented with as “absolute truth”
with regard to a phenomenon. In the case of very large sam-
ples, we found that may deviate substantially from changing
their beliefs to match the data. This evidence provides a coun-
terpoint to the implicit assumptions behind many design and
evaluation techniques for visualizations. The prevalence of
evaluations that rely on accuracy by comparing interpre-
tations to the data directly and the prevalence of design
guidelines that prioritize minimizing perceptual error are
more congruent with a normative view in which users should
match their beliefs to the data than one that emphasizes how
visualizations should be used to update users’ existing be-
liefs. The Bayesian approach we demonstrate provides a way
to quantify how much and in what direction people adjust
their beliefs based on new data. Rather than having to care-
fully craft questions that one thinks might show a difference
in accuracy between designs, an evaluator making use of
Bayesian models can simply elicit priors and posteriors from
a representative sample of users to understand how help-
ful a visualization is relative to another. We demonstrate a
graphical sample method that can be used to elicit beliefs for
arbitrary visualizations. The statistical literature offers tech-
niques for fitting distributions of varying types to samples
(including via Bayesian inference). By representing beliefs
as distributions, as we did in fitting participants’ responses
to Beta distributions, an evaluator can infer additional in-
formation about how users perceived presented data from
properties of the fit distributions. For example, we demon-
strated how one could calculate the sample size that a ratio-
nal Bayesian updater would have required to arrive at the
same posterior beliefs as the user did, providing a valuable
perspective on how a person was off in their interpretation.
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Eliciting Mental Representation of Uncertainty
Our work did not identify a single, optimal technique for
eliciting an untrained visualization user’s internal represen-
tation of uncertainty for a proportion. With the exception of
the graphical “balls-and-bins” interface, which tended to pro-
duce posterior beliefs that deviated slightly more from the
normative solution, the techniques were difficult to distin-
guish. However we suspect that for more complex datasets
and visual representations, the graphical sample-based tech-
nique is likely to have advantages. Imagine observed data
visualized as a line chart. A graphical sample-based technique
will allow people to simply drawmore lines to represent their
prior distribution, while other techniques would be more
cumbersome (e.g., eliciting intercepts and slopes).
Our demonstrations involved presenting a proportion
statistic. However even this simple scenario required re-
flecting on the best way to frame the elicitation of a prior.
We chose to elicit prior and posterior distributions directly.
These distributions are defined over parameter values (i.e., in
model space). We chose to change the icons in the icon array
format we used for elicitation and presentation to circles,
rather than human icons, to better align with the notion of
eliciting a population proportion. Alternatively, we could
have elicited the prior and posterior predictive distributions
by asking participants to think about the specific value (e.g.,
number of women) given some sample size.
In applying Bayesian modeling to interpretations of more
complex datasets and visualizations, we believe that an im-
portant consideration will be identifying the appropriate
level of “resolution” for the prior. For example, if the data is
a spatially distributed statistic shown in a choropleth map,
the relevant prior might involve subjective distributions over
values for individual states, or it may be best represented by
distributions over values at a national or regional level. In
evaluation scenarios involving Bayesian cognition, the eval-
uator might consider which prior best matches the intended
messages of the data presentation.
The insensitivity toward sample size of the observed data
that we reported in Study 2 may partially be because the
icon array did not encode sample size directly for the large
data. One takeaway is that visualizations should do more to
convey sample size, or impacts of sampling error.
One potential critique of using Bayesian cognition for
designing or evaluating visualizations might be that it is
unrealistic to expect lay visualization users to possess rea-
sonable (or meaningful) priors on phenomena that tend to
be presented to the public in outlets like data journalism.
However, we cite multiple forms of evidence to the contrary.
If people did not possess priors or were not able to articulate
them, we might expect that with the sample-based elicitation
techniques, which required providing samples with confi-
dence, we would see a number of unidentifiable distributions
due to all zero confidence values, or no variation in the sam-
ple values, for example. However, over 85% of participants
who used sample-based techniques provided valid probabil-
ity distributions. Moreover, across all elicitation techniques
we saw that these distributions had non-trivial predictive
power for posterior beliefs. A Bayesian model constructed
with personal priors achieved a better fit (using Watanabe-
Akaike Information Criterion (WAIC) [11, 53]) than did a
model constructed with the aggregate priors or assuming a
uniform prior (WAIC = 2315.7, 3159.8, 3159.8, respectively;
see supplemental material for full details). Finally, several
decades worth of work on probability elicitation in large
surveys of the public have led economists to believe that
laypeople are capable of providing useful information about
real world phenomena via subjective probabilities [34].
8 CONCLUSION
Our work started by asking “Can Bayesian inference be used
to explain how people update their beliefs upon viewing
a data presentation?” In sum, our results demonstrate the
promise of using Bayesian cognitive modeling to understand
how data presentations like visualizations shape beliefs. Our
work demonstrates a path toward better aligning studies
of data interpretation with the undeniable effects of prior
knowledge, and provides a valuable framework for evaluat-
ing new presentation methods.
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